Indiana Chattel Security Devices v. Article 9 Uniform Commercial Code by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 1 Article 5
Fall 1956
Indiana Chattel Security Devices v. Article 9
Uniform Commercial Code
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1956) "Indiana Chattel Security Devices v. Article 9 Uniform Commercial Code," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 32 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol32/iss1/5
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Probably the most expeditious procedure would be for individuals
or groups who see the local needs to apply to the state commission for a
conservancy district. After determining the nature of the problem and
the feasibility of proposed solutions, the commission could formulate,
subject to hearings and judicial review, a definite plan and mark off
the geographical limits of the district. Such a commission would also
be able to coordinate the operations of one district with another, and
with municipalities and other governmental agencies concerned with the
problems of water management."s Maximum use must be made of every
district, e.g. the prime purpose of a given district may be flood control,
but the district administrators should be free to sell the retained water
to farmers, towns, and industries, and where possible, make recreational
facilities available for public enjoyment."0
Provision for adequate financing is most essential. Bonding power,
coupled with the power to tax or assess to retire the obligations, are re-
quired for the large capital outlays which would be necessary in many of
the conservation plans. Since one conservancy act has been declared
unconstitutional, a new act must be drafted with great care so that in-
vestors will not hesitate to purchase the obligations necessary to finance
the projects Indiana needs for its future development.' 0
INDIANA CHATTEL SECURITY DEVICES v. ARTICLE 9
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In 1955 the Indiana Legislature added to the already overburdened
area of chattel security statutes by enacting a factor's lien act.' In so
expert in water management either as to recognition of problems or the feasibility of
alternative methods of solution. Under this procedure each district became a separate
entity without provision for an interchange of ideas and experience with other districts
having similar problems.
98. There are many federal agencies involved. e.g. The Army Corps of Engineers,
The Soil Conservation Service, the United States Geological Survey.
99. The goal of maximum beneficial use must be carefully balanced with the goal
of governmental non-interference with the individual. The old Conservancy Act was
deficient in this respect because of the wide powers given the district commissioners
to pursue objectives of water management not petitioned for and possibly not desired
by the people affected.
100. When the Pennsylvania RR. attacked the constitutionality of the Conservancy
Act, an amnicas curia brief was filed by the firm of Ross, McCord, Ice, and Miller
calling attention to the fact that there were two issues of bonds outstanding from
existing conservancy districts. The Court did not rule on the question of the bonds
validity but did call attention to a line of cases which indicated that the obligations
of the district, even though unconstitutionally created, were valid. Indiana ex -el.
Pennsylvania RR. v. Iroquois Conservancy District Court, 133 N.E.2d 848, 855 n.10
(Ind. 1956).
1. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 43-1201 to -1210 (Burns Supp. 1955).
NOTES
doing the Legislature has affirmed the questionable reasoning that every
chattel security problem should be met by a separate security device.2
The Factor's Lien Act, which permits a lender to obtain a valid lien on
inventory of a borrower, seeks to answer the problems raised by the use
of inventory as collateral. Obviously inventory, usually maintained at
a fairly stable total amount, is constantly turning over as items are sold
and replacements are purchased; items originally subjected to the lien are
soon replaced. If the business needs of the borrower require a loan re-
maining at a constant level for a period of time rather than a short term
self-liquidating loan,' then the security device should provide for three
things: (1) borrower's authority to sell the originally secured inventory;
(2) the lien's automatic attachment to after-acquired replacement in-
ventory; (3) sufficient flexibility of the lien to allow the borrower to
use at least part of the proceeds from his sales to meet his business ex-
penses.' A device containing these provisions is commonly referred to as
a floating lien.
The rash of factor's lien acts erupting in the last fifteen years' is a
symptom of the business need for inventory financing and also indicates
that prior security devices were too restrictive to make such financing
practical.' Obviously, the common law pledge, which requires the pledgee
to retain possession of the collateral, is inadequate.7 In many jurisdic-
tions a chattel mortgage which allows the mortgagor to sell the collateral
is void as a fraud on the creditors of the mortgagor,' and a number of
jurisdictions do not permit a lien to attach to after-acquired property
The trust receipt, as codified in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, al-
though permitting the sale of the collateral, cannot be used to encumber
after-acquired inventory."0 Furthermore, the Uniform Trust Receipts
2. For an excellent article criticizing this reasoning and indicating some inherent
pitfalls see Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 27(1951).
3. A self-liquidating loan requires the borrower to turn over proceeds of the sale
of collateral to the lender to reduce the debt. The life of such a loan is therefore
limited to the period required for the borrower to sell enough of the encumbered mer-
chandise to pay off the loan.
4. See Gilmore and Axelrod, Chattel Security, 57 YALE L.E . 517, 533-35 (1948).
5. See note 15 infra.
6. See Skilton, The Factors Lien On. Merchandise, 1955 Vis. L. REV. 356.
7. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 1 (1941).
8. Cohen and Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COLUm. L. REv. 1338 (1939).
Authorities by jurisdiction are exhaustively compiled, id. at 1338 n. 4.
9. See Cohen and Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REv.
635 (1939).
10. UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTs AcT § 14; IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-614 (Burns 1951).
This section provides that the trust receipt may be used to obtain a security interest
in goods only when new value is given by the lender or when the particular goods to
become subject to the trust receipt lien are already subject to a previous security interest
in the lender. The latter provision envisions a situation where the lender already has a
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Act only permits borrowers to acquire new inventory from a third party;
the trust receipt cannot be used to secure a loan on inventory already in
the hands of the borrower." The conditional sale for resale,' 2 appropri-
ate only for lenders who are also sellers of the goods, is of minor im-
portance in inventory financing. Field warehousing, however, can be
useful in a proper situation. This pledge device permits the pledgee to
take possession of the goods at the borrower's place of business and to
release them to the borrower as they become needed. 3 Unfortunately,
field warehousing in many situations is comparatively expensive, cumber-
some, and may be easily upset by a trustee in bankruptcy if a court con-
siders the pledgee's control over the goods or records of the transaction
insufficient.' 4 To overcome these restrictions in prior security law,
twenty-three states have enacted factor's lien acts permitting lenders to
obtain a security interest in the inventory or accounts receivable of the
borrower. 5
In contrast to most states, Indiana security law before enactment of
the Factor's Lien Act was relatively unrestrictive. The Indiana Chattel
security interest in the goods and surrenders that interest in exchange for a trust
receipt security interest in the same goods. New value is defined to include new advances
or loans, but to exclude extensions or renewals of existing obligations of the borrower.
The extension of the lender's lien, which is security for an already existing debt, to after
acquired goods would not come within the permissible limits of this section. See
Bogert, The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 26 (1935).
11. UNIFORm TRUST RECEIPTS AcT § 2(1) (a) limits the use of the device to
situations where "the entruster or any third person delivers to the trustee goods ... "
12. UNIFORIM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 9; IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-808 (Burns
1951).
13. See Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 COLUm. L. REV. 991 (1942).
14. Compare McGaffey Canning Company v. Bank of America, 109 Cal. App.
415, 294 Pac. 45 (1930), with Barry v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 190 F.2d 433 (9th
Cir. 1951).
15. Alabama (1947), ALA. CODE tit. 47, §§ 132 (1)-(8) (Supp. 1955) ; Connecticut
(1945), CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7256-64 (1949) ; Delaware (1947), DEL. CODE ANN. tit
25, §§ 3301-10 (1953) ; Indiana (1955), IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1201 to -1210 (Bums
Supp. 1955) ; Maine (1945), ME. REV. STAT. c. 181, §§ 4-11 (1954) ; Maryland (1945),
MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 2, §§ 22-29 (1951) ; Massachusetts (1945), MASS. ANN.
LAWS c. 255, §§ 40-47 (Supp. 1955) ; Michigan (1947), MicH. CoMP. LAWS §H 570.501
to .512 (1948) ; Minnesota (1947), MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 514.80-91 (West Supp. 1955) ;
Missouri (1945), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 430.320 (Vernon 1952); New Hampshire (1943),
N.H. REV. LAWS c. 446, §§ 446:1-10 (1955); New Jersey (1942), N.J. REv. STAT.
§§ 2A:44-178 to -186 (Supp. 1952); New York (1911), N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45
(1949 as amended Supp. 1955) ; North Carolina (1945), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-70 to 76
(1950); Ohio (1945), OHIO CODE ANN. §§ 1311.59-64 (1953) ; Rhode Island (1938),
R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 447, §§ 1-10 (1938) ; South Carolina (1938), S.C. CODE § 45-401
to -410 (1952) ; Tennessee (1953), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-1801 to -1807 (1955);
Texas (1947), TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 5506c §§ 1-10 (1948) ; Vermont (1947), VT.
REV. STAT. §§ 2738-51 (1947) ; Virginia (1944), VA. CODE §H 55-143 to -152 (1950);
West Virginia 1945), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3946 (17)-(24) (1955); Wisconsin (1951),
WIs. STAT. § 241.145 (1953). A table comparing the provisions of the various statutes is
found in Skilton, op. cit. supra note 6, at 396.
NOTES
Mortgage Act' is one of the most liberal in the country, and by authoriz-
ing a mortgage on inventory 7 and permitting the mortgagor to sell the
collateral' it resembles a factor's lien act. The mortgage may include
replacements of any mortgaged property, 9 and may also secure future
advances made by the mortgagee..2 ' However, the act is not flexible
enough to permit the mortgagor to use the proceeds of sales to meet his
business expenses; proceeds must be applied to the liquidation of the
debt.2 ' This requirement prevents a true floating lien by demanding
that the loan be self-liquidating. However, the parties may avoid this
result by creating a revolving-type transaction. Under such an arrange-
ment the mortgagor turns the proceeds of sales over to the mortgagee,
but the mortgagee periodically makes new loans of amounts needed by the
mortgagor. The new loans are secured by the original mortgage, as
permitted by the future advance section of the statute.2   The mortgagee
should require the mortgagor to maintain his inventory at a minimum
inventory-to-loan ratio, and since the statute allows the mortgage to at-
tach to replacement inventory, the mortgagee would have his loan secured
by such inventory. This inconvenient arrangement would have to be
closely controlled by the mortgagee, but it would have the effect of a
floating lien. 3
Likewise, the liberal Indiana Trust Receipts Act2" fails to provide an
"easy" floating lien. Indiana has substantially modified the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act by expressly permitting use of a trust receipt to secure
16. INh. ANN. STAT. §§ 51-501 to -521 (Burns 1951).
17. Id. § 51-501 (k).
18. Id. § 51-506.
19. Id. § 51-505.
20. Id. § 51-503.
21. Id. § 51-506.
22. Id. § 51-503.
23. See HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES
FINANCING 527 (1954); Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Finaicing, 62
HARV. L. REv. 588 (1949). Dunham explains the mechanics of such a revolving trans-
action. "The lender agrees to loan up to 50 percent of the cost of the inventory. Each
day's proceeds are paid over to the lender, who then makes new loans to bring the loan
ratio back up to the 50 per cent agreed upQn. Suppose, for example, the X Manufacturing
Company borrows $100,000 on security of $200,000 cost value of inventory. On a typical
day it sells inventory costing $4,000 for $8,000, which sum is transferred to the lender.
It also receives new inventory costing $4,000. The loan has been reduced to $92,000, but
the collateral, counting the deduction and the addition, is still $200,000. The X
Manufacturing Company is accordingly entitled to a new loan of $8,000. Realistically,
of course, this arrangement is equivalent to a 'floating course'-a loan of $100,000 on
security of inventory costing $200,000 with an agreement to keep the security at this
value, but with no obligation to account for proceeds." Id. at 596.
24. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 51-601 to -621 (Burns 1951).
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a loan on inventory already in the hands of the borrower.2" This provi-
sion allows the Indiana trust receipt to operate substantially as a chattel
mortgage, and greatly expands its normal function of enabling the bor-
rower to acquire new inventory." However, the trust receipt covers
neither after-acquired goods2" nor future advances,2" and would thus be
inadequate for creating a floating lien, although a revolving-type loan
might be possible.29
It is also possible in Indiana to lend money on the security of a bor-
rower's accounts receivable." When the assignment of the accounts is in
writing, signed by the borrower, and given for a valuable consideration,
the requirements of the Assignment of Accounts Receivable statute are
met. 1 No filing is required, account debtors need not be notified, and
the borrower may continue to collect the accounts. 2 However, the
statute does not provide for the attachment of the lender's lien on future
accounts. A valid floating lien on accounts receivable can not be
perfected. 2
Since prior Indiana statutes permitted a lender to acquire a valid lien
on the inventory or accounts receivable of a borrower, the Legislature ap-
parently adopted the Factor's Lien Act either to make such a transaction
easier and more convenient to accomplish, or to validate the floating
lien without the necessity of the parties resorting to cumbersome revolv-
ing-type loan procedures. Unfortunately, the latter goal has not been
entirely accomplished. Moreover, the Legislature apparently felt that
existing devices were an adequate solution to the financing problems of
retail merchants, since the new act is expressly limited to "owner[s] of
merchandise at wholesale."2 "
25. In Indiana the trust receipt may be used in a transaction whereby "the entruster
gives new value in reliance upon the transfer by the trustee to such entruster of a security
intreest in goods or documents in possession of the trustee and the possession of which
is retained by the trustee." Id. § 51-602(1) (c).
26. This amendment has been characterized by Karl N. Llewellyn, the draftsman
of the Uniform Act, as "disemboweling." HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COIMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, 48th Annual Conference
105 (1938).
27. See note 10 supra.
28. IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-614 (Burns 1951).
29. This could be accomplished by requiring the borrower to pay over proceeds
of sales and by then making new loans on the security of trust receipts on replacement
inventory. Since the Trust Receipts Act adopts notice filing rather than recording,
there would be no necessity of filing the subsequent trust receipts. See note 23 supra.
30. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-2101 to -2104 (Burns 1950).
31. Id. § 19-2102.
32. Id. § 19-2103.
33. Again, however, a revolving transaction similar to that described in note 23
supra could be utilized by extending new loans on the security of new accounts receivable.
See Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 392 (1952).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1201 (Burns Supp. 1955).
NOTES
Briefly, the act provides that the lender (factor) and the borrower
file a notice of lien with the county recorder." The factor and borrower
must enter a written agreement which gives the factor a continuing lien
upon such merchandise of the borrower as is designated." The lien
attaches automatically to all proceeds from the sale of the designated
merchandise, presumably attaches to after-acquired inventory," and se-
cures the factor for future loans. 8 Although the provisions are not too
clear, the Act also seems to permit a lien on the security of accounts
receivable independent of any accompanying lien on merchandise." Ap-
35. Id. § 43-1203.
36. Id. § 43-1202.
37. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1202 (Burns Supp. 1955) provides that the "lien shall be
valid from the time of filing the notice hereinafter referred to, whether such merchandise
shall be in existence at the time of the execution of the written agreement providing
for the creation of the lien or at the time of filing such notice or shall come into
existence subsequently thereto or shall subsequently thereto be acquired by the borrower."
This provision would appear to extend the lien to after-acquired inventory. However,
rather unfortunate wording earlier in § 43-1202 has evoked some concern that in order
to perfect a lien on replacement inventory it will be necessary for the parties to execute
separate written designations covering such inventory as it is received by the borrower.
Letter from Paul R. Moo, Assistant General Counsel, Associates Investment Company,
South Bend, Indiana, to Indiana Law Journal, May 1, 1956. "If so provided by any
written agreement with the borrower, a factor shall have a continuing lien upon such
merchandise of the borrower as is from time to time after the execution of said written
agreement designated in one or more separate written statements dated and signed by
the borrower and delivered to the factor. . . ." IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1202 (Burns
Supp. 1955). Under this language it is questionable whether a designation of "all the
raw materials, goods in process, and finished products which are or subsequently will
be held in the borrower's plant" would be sufficient to cover merchandise to be later
acquired. If a new designation must be executed to extend the lien to inventory received
after the original designation, then problems arise as to how often the factor should
require such "separate written statements." If this construction were placed on the act,
it would appear that a trustee in bankruptcy would prevail over the factor as to all
inventory received by the borrower subsequent to the last designation. Such an unfortu-
nate construction would require the parties to engage in a mass of unnecessary paper-
work. Indiana apparently borrowed this language with some modification from a
section of the Ohio act which has received no judicial construction. OHIO CODE ANN.
§ 1311.60 (1953). In construing the words "continuing general lien" in the New Hamp-
shire act, the court held that separate designations were not necessary to perfect the
factor's lien on after-acquired goods. "It seems improbable that our Legislature
intended that a general store borrower, for example, must separately consign each spool
of thread, can of beans or package of gum to a lender bank in order to maintain the
lien." Colbath v. Mechanicks National Bank, 96 N.H. 110, 113, 70 A.2d 608, 610 (1950).
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1202 (Burns Supp. 1955).
39. There are several situations in which accounts receivable could become involved
in a factor's lien transaction: (1) When they arise as proceeds of the sale of encumbered
merchandise. The factor clearly obtains a lien on these accounts. Id. §§ 43-1202, 07.
(2) When a factor obtains a lien on the borrower's merchandise and also receives as
additional security an assignment of the borrower's accounts not arising out of the sale of
encumbered merchandise. The act apparently permits this; § 43-1205 provides "where
accounts receivable, whether or not arising out of the sale of merchandise which has
become subject to the lien provided for by this act, are assigned to a factor. .. "
(3) When the factor is interested in obtaining a lien on accounts receivable and not on
merchandise. The portion of § 43-1205 quoted above would appear to permit this.
Section 43-1202 (c) states that the filing statement must contain "the general character of
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parently only present and not future accounts receivable may be encum-
bered4" unless the future accounts arise out of the sale of merchandise
already subject to the lien of the factor.41
The foregoing examination of the Indiana security situation reveals
an unusual degree of overlap between the various statutes: at least four
separate statutes permit a lender to gain a security interest in the inven-
tory of a borrower.4 " Each statute has its own formalities, and each
gives different rights and duties to the immediate parties to the trans-
action and to interested third parties." Two statutes are specifically
merchandise and/or accounts receivable subject to the lien." Reading "and/or" in the
disjunctive, it would appear that the lien could be perfected solely on accounts receivable
without including merchandise. However, § 43-1202, the heart of the act, speaks only of
a lien on merchandise and accounts receivable rising out of the sale of encumbered
merchandise. To further confuse the issue § 43-1201 defines factors as "persons . . .
who advance money on the security of merchandise...." Reading the act as a whole,
however, it would appear that the factor's lien can be used to finance on the sole
security of accounts receivable.
40. Assuming that the act may be used for accounts receivable financing, see note
39 supra, it remains silent on the subject of assignment of future accounts receivable.
Thus, it appears that the common law prohibition against such assignment remains in
force. This result was reached by a court in construing a similar provision of the
New Hampshire factor's lien act. Manchester Nat. Bank v. Roche, 186 F2d 827 (1st
Cir. 1951). Actually future accounts receivable are analogous to after-acquired inventory,
and there seems to be no overriding policy reason for permitting a mortgage of the
latter and prohibiting an assignment of the former. If filing is enough notice to
prospective creditors to protect them in their dealings with a borrower who has encum-
bered his after-acquired inventory, then it should likewise protect them if he has
assigned his future accounts. See 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
§ 592 (1940).
41. Section 43-1207 provides that the creation of a lien on the borrower's merchan-
dise will operate as an automatic assignment of accounts receivable which will result
from the sale of such merchandise.
42. The Conditional Sales Act, Chattel Mortgage Act, Trust Receipts Act, and
Factor's Lien Act.
43. For example, the conditional sale is valid against third parties without record-
ing. The chattel mortgage and factor's lien must be recorded with the county recorder
to be valid against third parties, while the validity of the trust receipt depends upon
filing with the Secretary of State. Recording in the wrong set of books renders the
lien void in most cases. The chattel mortgage is valid from the time of recording as
against all unsecured creditors and all subsequent lienors. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 51-502,504
(Burns 1951). An unrecorded chattel mortgage, however, is invalid against subsequent
mortgagees and creditors, but apparently valid as against prior creditors. Id. § 51-504.
The trust receipt is valid for 30 days without filing as against all creditors of the trustee.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-608 (1) (Burns 1951). It is void "as against lien creditors who
become such after such 30 day period and without notice of such interest and before
filing." Id. § 51-608 (2). The factor's lien is effective "from the time of filing as
against . . . unsecured creditors . . . and . . . subsequent liens of creditors .. "
IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1204 (Burns Supp. 1955). From this variety of provisions a
number of possible situations could arise in which the rights of creditors would vary
depending on the form of the transaction. For example, assume that B has received
merchandise and has received a loan from L in return for a security interest in the
merchandise. L delays filing. C, a creditor of B, attaches the merchandise 20 days later.
If the security arrangement between B and L is a chattel mortgage or a factor's lien, C
will prevail over L since the security interest does not become perfected until filed.
If the security arrangement is a trust receipt, L will prevail since his lien is valid for
NOTES
concerned with assignment of accounts receivable; again the rights of
the immediate and of third parties may vary depending upon what form
the immediate parties adopt." Many inventory finance problems could
be handled under any one of these acts, and little justification exists for
treating the rights of the immediate parties and especially the rights of
third parties differently merely because of the form which the trans-
action takes.
Overlap in security statutes was the precise evil which the draftsmen
of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code sought to avoid." The
Code would supersede existing security devices and "provide a simple
and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day
secured financing transactions could go forward with less cost and with
greater certainty."4  The Code bases the important distinctions on the
type of property constituting the collateral and not on the form of the
transaction. Where appropriate, special rules are applied to transactions
involving different types of property. "The scheme of the Article is to
30 days without filing. If L has received his security interest as a result of a conditional
sale to B, then L will prevail because the conditional sale need not be recorded and is
valid from the time it is made.
The statutes vary on the procedures necessary when the borrower defaults. The
provisions in the Conditional Sales Act are fairly strict as to what the conditional seller
may do on default. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-814 to -824. The provisoins of the Trust
Receipts Act are considerably less strict. IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-606 (Burns 1951).
Nether the Chattel Mortgage Act nor the Factor's Lien Act contains -any default
provisions. The rights of the lender and third parties to the proceeds of sales also
vary from act to act.
44. For example, under the Factor's Lien Act the borrower may make adjustments
and grant credits and allowances to account debtors. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1205 (Burns
Supp. 1955). However, the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act contains no such
provisions and presumably under the doctrine of Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co.,
38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930), the borrower would be precluded from making such adjust-
ments. See note 69 infra and accompanying text. Under the Factor's Lien Act a lender's
security interest in a borrower's accounts is a matter of record and affords notice to the
borrower's prospective creditors. However, an assignment of accounts under the
Accounts Receivable Act is not recorded and prospective creditors or subsequent
assignees may therefore be unable to easily discover the lender's interest in the accounts.
45. "Existing law recognizes a wide variety of security devices, which came into
use at various times to make possible different types of secured financing. Differences
between one device and another persist, in formal requisites, in the secured party's
rights against the debtor and third parties . . . and in filing requirements, despite the
fact that today many of those differences no longer serve any useful function. [I]n
some states half a dozen separate filing systems . . . are maintained . . . each of
which must be separately checked to determine a debtor's status. In recent years our
security law has grown in complexity at an alarming rate. The growing complexity
of financing transactions forces us to keep piling new statutory provisions on top of our
inadequate and already sufficiently complicated nineteenth-century structure of security
law. The results of this continuing development are, and will be, increasing costs to both
parties and increasing uncertainty as to their rights and the rights of third parties
dealing with them." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment.
46. Ibid.
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make necessary distinctions along functional rather than formal lines." 7
Unfortunately, Indiana is enmeshed in the exact security tangle from
which the draftsmen of the Code have extended a means of escape.
In addition to the general problem of overlap just discussed, the
Indiana statutes fail to deal with several specific problems. The first of
these concerns the rights of the lender and of third parties in the pro-
ceeds of sales of encumbered inventory. Neither the Chattel Mortgage
Act nor the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act makes specific pro-
vision for the rights of various parties in the proceeds arising from the
borrower's disposition of the collateral. Neither act informs the lender
how often he should police the borrower's activities to maintain his lien
on proceeds, and neither appears to face the problem of the lender's rights
in proceeds which are misapplied by the borrower. The Trust Receipts
Act extends the lender's security interest to proceeds or the value of
proceeds, whether such proceeds are identifiable or not, received by the
borrower within ten days prior to bankruptcy or to a demand made by
the lender for an accounting. 8 The lien is also extended to any other
identifiable proceeds unless the lender has waived his right to an ac-
counting." Thus the Trust Receipts Act improves upon the Chattel
Mortgage Act by informing the lender how often he should police the
borrower's activities to protect his lien on proceeds."
The Factor's Lien Act gives the factor a lien on the accounts re-
ceivable or other proceeds arising from the sale of encumbered mer-
chandise.5  However, the act is silent as to the factor's position when
the borrower receives proceeds and applies them to his own use. This
statutory void leaves unanswered the question whether the lien on the
proceeds continues or is lost, and, if lost, when and as to what classes of
third parties. The act also fails to consider that proceeds may take dif-
ferent forms. It would appear unreasonable to allow the lien to con-
tinue on cash proceeds or negotiable instruments so that the factor could
follow such proceeds into the hands of third parties. On the other hand
there might be justification for allowing the factor to follow conditional
sales contracts into the hands of a subsequent assignee who could more
47. Ibid.
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-610(b) (Burns 1951).
49. Id. § 51-610(c). The entruster's lien may be waived "by words or conduct;
and knowledge by the entruster of the existence of proceeds, without demand for ac-
counting made within ten days from such knowledge, shall be deemed a waiver."
Ibid. See also Universal Credit Company v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E.2d
28 (1945).
50. To protect his lien on proceeds the entruster should demand accountings every
10 days since a waiver by conduct would likely result if the entruster, knowing that the
borrower's business entailed frequent sales, failed to demand such frequent accountings.
51. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 43-1202, 07 (Burns Supp. 1955).
NOTES
justifiably be held on notice of the factor's interest, since the assignment
of such contracts is less likely to be in the ordinary course of the bor-
rower's business. Apparently when proceeds are accounts receivable the
factor will prevail over a subsequent assignee of the accounts from the
borrower.' 2
The Uniform Commercial Code, unlike existing Indiana statutes,
clearly spells out the rights of the secured party to proceeds. Section
9-306 delineates the situations in which a third party will prevail over
the secured party. The secured party's interest continues on identifiable
proceeds without further act of the parties.53 If the proceeds are cash
(defined to include checks) the security interest continues on identifiable
cash proceeds; when insolvency proceedings intervene, the secured party
has only a right to an amount of the debtor's cash and bank accounts
equal to the amount of cash proceeds received by the borrower within ten
days of insolvency proceedings, without regard to whether funds in the
debtor's possession are identifiable as cash proceeds.54 However, the
secured party leaves proceeds in the hands of the borrower at his own
risk. If the borrower transfers these in the ordinary course of business
the transferee generally will prevail over the secured party.55 The se-
cured party can neither follow cash proceeds into the hands of third
parties ;" nor follow negotiable instruments or negotiable documents of
title into the hands of a holder in due course or a bona fide purchaser, as
filing does not constitute notice to such third parties." A buyer of goods
in the ordinary course of business will prevail over the secured party's
interest in goods received by the borrower as proceeds.58 Likewise, a
purchaser of chattel paper from the borrower for new value in the ordi-
nary course of business with or without actual knowledge of the secured
party's interest will prevail.5" If the proceeds are accounts receivable the
52. Id. § 43-1207. This section provides that such accounts are deemed assigned to
the factor under the provisions of the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act. IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 19-2101 to -2104 (Burns 1950). The assignment is deemed perfected immediately
after the sale of the goods without further acts of the parties. The Accounts Receivable
Act provides that the first assignee prevails over a subsequent assignee.
53. UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 9-306 (1).
54. Id. § 9-306(2), Comment 2(a).
55. Id. § 9-306, Comment 2(c).
56. Id. § 9-306 (2).
57. Id. § 9-309.
58. Id. § 9-307.
59. Id. § 9-306(4). Comment 2(c) explains this policy on chattel paper. "Notice
that, unlike § 9-308 where the original collateral is the chattel paper itself, it is not
required that the transferee of the conditional sales contract constituting proceeds be
ignorant of the inventory lien. This is a deliberate distinction, made in order that
financers of inventory may not have a legal right to monopolize the financing of the
resulting chattel paper. In § 9-308, where the original collateral is the chattel paper
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secured party will prevail over a subsequent assignee.6"
It is apparent that the Indiana chattel security statutes overlap each
other in a confusing manner and also fail to adequately delineate the
rights of various interested parties in the proceeds of sales of encumbered
merchandise. In addition, all of the Indiana statutes appear to fall into
at least one of the two basic traps that menace liens on inventory and
accounts receivable: the threat of at least partial avoidance as a prefer-
ence in bankruptcy or the threat of total avoidance as a fraudulent con-
veyance.
While the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1950 to eliminate the
most serious obstacle to inventory financing,61 there remains another
bankruptcy problem inherent in any inventory security arrangement
itself, this reasoning does not apply, and the transferee's actual knowledge that the
specific chattel paper is subject to the security interest defeats the transferee."
60. Id. § 9-306(1), Comment 4.
61. The 1938 amendment to § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 22, 1938, c.
575, § 60, 52 STAT. 869, as interpreted by Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co.
v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), posed two very serious threats to inventory and ac-
counts receivable financing. The amendment provided that unless a transfer by a
debtor to a creditor was so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from or creditor
of the debtor could acquire rights superior to the transferee's, the transfer would be
deemed to have been made immediately before the debtor's bankruptcy. Such transfer
was thus voidable as a preference. The Klauder case held that under Pennsylvania
law a non-notification assignment of accounts receivable was voidable by the trustee
in bankruptcy since a hypothetical subsequent assignee of the accounts who first
collected or first notified the account debtors would prevail over the original assignee.
Many states reacted almost immediately to this holding by passing legislation to avoid
the rule. Indiana's Accounts Receivable Statute, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-2101 to -2104,
was passed in response to the Klauder case and avoided the rule by providing that the
first assignee would prevail over a subsequent assignee. However, the rule of the
Klauder case went deeper than accounts receivable and threatened all inventory security
devices. Under all such devices a purchaser from stock in the ordinary course of the
borrower's business takes good title as against the secured party. A literal interpretation
of the 1938 version of § 60 would mean that such a security interest could never be so
far perfected as to pass the test of the hypothetical bona fide purchaser. Therefore
all such interests were vulnerable to avoidance by the trustee in bankruptcy.
Secondly, most inventory security devices have to be recorded before effective
against the borrower's creditors. Since there is almost always some time lag between
making the loan and recording, a literal interpretation of § 60 would mean that such
transfer of security would be deemed to have been made at the time of recording. As
recording would necessarily occur after the loan was made, the loan would become a
transfer for an antecedent debt and would be voidable as a preference for four months
after recording.
Fortunately, in 1950 Congress again amended § 60, 64 STAT. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C.
§ 96 (1952). The test of perfection was changed from the hypothetical bona fide pur-
chaser concept to a consideration of whether a hypothetical "subsequent lien upon such
property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could have
become superior to the rights of the transferee." Ibid. This part of the amendment
overcomes the first threat raised by the Klauder case since a lien creditor under inventory
security statutes does not prevail over the secured party. The second problem was
overcome by providing that a recording within 21 days of the transfer would cause the
transfer to be deemed to have been made at the actual time of the transfer. See Country-
man, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and Section 6o of the
Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 76 (1951).
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which permits the lien to attach to after-acquired property. The secured
party gets a security interest in property which comes into the borrower's
hands after the loan has been made. Such property, if received within
four months of bankruptcy, might be deemed security for an antecedent
debt and voidable as a preference.62
Both the Chattel Mortgage Act and the Factor's Lien Act permit
the security interest to extend to after-acquired property. The former
act makes no attempt to solve this problem, and a mortgage which in-
cluded after-acquired property thus might be avoided by the borrower's
trustee in bankruptcy to the extent that the inventory on hand had been
received within four months of bankruptcy. The Legislature apparently
anticipated this problem in drafting the Factor's Lien Act by providing
that the time of the lien's attachment to after-acquired property relates
back to the time that the notice is filed rather than to the date on which
the property is actually acquired by the borrower.63 This commendable
provision should abrogate a problem which would otherwise increase the
factor's uncertainty.
Section 9-108 of the Code meets this preference problem in a more
direct manner. "Where a secured party . . . gives new value which is
to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired property his security
interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for
such new value and not as security for a pre-existing claim. . -64
The Code goes a step further by anticipating that the same preference
argument might be used in relation to proceeds of sales received by the
borrower within four months of bankruptcy. Under Section 9-306,
whenever a debtor sells collateral the security interest "continues on any
identifiable proceeds received by the debtor .. ."" The Code empha-
sizes "that the four-month period for calculating a voidable preference in
bankruptcy begins with the date of the secured party's obtaining the
62. Cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corp., 68F. 2d 864 (2d Cir. 1934) ;
It re Baumgartner, 55 F. 2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1931) ; Wolfe v. Bank of Anderson, 238
Fed. 343 (4th Cir. 1916); In re Lambert and Braceland Co. 29 F. 2d 758 (E.D. Pa.
1928). But cf. In re Pusey, 122 F. 2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941).
63. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1202 (Bums Supp. 1955).
64. UNIFORM COMMERClAL CODE § 9-108 (2). A few commentators express doubt
whether such a provision would stand up in bankruptcy. Kupfer, Accounts Receivable,
Trust Receipt, and Related Types of Financing Under Article 9 of the Uniform Cont-
inercial Code, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 278 (1953) ; Kripke, The Modemization of Comnercial
Security Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 183 (1951).
Kripke states, "Assuming that the intent is to state that the uncomfortable fact shall
not have its ordinary legal consequences, it may be questioned whether any state
legislation can affect the definition of preference in the Bankruptcy Act. At any rate,
the point has been a troublesome one and the effort to solve it is all to the good."
Id. at 195.
65. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306 (1).
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security interest in the original collateral and not with the date of his
obtaining control of the proceeds.""0
A further threat facing inventory and accounts receivable financing
devices is the threat of avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance. The
fraudulent conveyance threat is commonly associated with the case of
Benedict v. Ratner," which held that an assignee of accounts receivable
must require the assignor to account for all proceeds from collections of
accounts. The Benedict doctrine prohibits the borrower from diverting
these proceeds to his own use. If he does divert the proceeds, the as-
signee's lien is void as against creditors of the borrower not only as to
the proceeds appropriated by the borrower, but on all other assigned
accounts as well, such a transaction being "deemed fraudulent in law.""8
The Benedict doctrine has been extended to situations where the borrower
accepts returned goods from the account debtor, credits the latter's ac-
count, and then takes dominion over the goods. In such a case the bor-
rower must segregate the returned goods from the balance of his in-
ventory and cannot re-sell these goods unless he remits the proceeds of
sale to the assignor.69 A companion rule, the doctrine of ostensible
ownership, demands that the lender require the prompt remittance of
proceeds of sales of inventory to maintain the validity of his lien.T
The Benedict case purported to announce the New York rule ap-
plicable to the borrower's control of proceeds of sale of inventory and
then by analogy extended the rule to control over proceeds of accounts
receivable.71 Since the rule is founded in state law, its effect can be
abrogated by state statute." Unless Indiana has a rule, similar to New
York's, which will invalidate a lender's lien on inventory or accounts
receivable when the borrower is permitted unrestricted dominion over
the proceeds, the Benedict doctrine poses no threat to inventory and ac-
counts receivable financing in Indiana. However, a line of cases, apply-
ing the Indiana fraudulent conveyance statute,73 has held that when there
is no agreement that borrower account for proceeds, and the borrower is
permitted, either by an express or implied agreement, to sell the property
66. Id. § 9-306, Comment 2 (b).
67. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
68. Id. at 360.
69. Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co., 38 F. 2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930).
70. See cases collected in Annot., 73 A.L.R. 236 (1931).
71. "Whether the rule applies to accounts does not appear to have been passed upon
by the Court of Appeals of New York. But it would seem clear that whether the
collateral consist of chattels or of accounts, reservation or dominion inconsistent
with the effective disposition of title must render the transaction void." Benedict v.
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1925).
72. See 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 583 (1940).
73. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 33-408 to -409 (Burns 1949).
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and appropriate the proceeds to his own use, the transaction will be void
as a fraud on creditors.7" This rule developed before the adoption of the
Chattel Mortgage Act which codified the rule by requiring, as a condi-
74. The early Indiana cases held that a mortgage on a stock of goods which per-
mitted the mortgagor to remain in possession and which did not contain a stipulation
requiring the mortgagor to apply the proceeds of sale to his own use was void on its
face. Also, even if the mortgage was valid on its face, proof that the mortgagor had
disposed of goods and applied the proceeds to his own use would void the mortgage.
Robinson v. Elliott, 89 U.S. (22 Wal.) 513 (1874) (case arose in Indiana) ; Davenport
v. Foulke, 68 Ind. 382 (1879) ; Mobley v. Letts, 61 Ind. 11 (1878) ; The New Albany
Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxson, 21 Ind. 355 (1863). The rule was changed somewhat by
McFadden v. Fritz, 90 Ind. 590 (1883), which held that a mortgage on goods could not
be held void on its face but that fraud in such a case was a question of fact. The court
stated that the earlier cases had properly applied the common law rule, but that an
Indiana statute (§ 4924 R. S. 1881) had modified that rule by making fraud in all
such cases a question of fact. However, the court failed to indicate what facts would
need to be proved to void the mortgage. It is interesting to note that the statute on which
the court relied was enacted in 1852 [1 R.S. 1852, ch. 42, § 21, p. 299, now IND. ANN.
STAT. § 33-412 (Burns 1949)] and was the Indiana law when the earlier cases were
decided. The case of New v. Sailors, 114 Ind. 407, 16 N.E. 609 (1887), defined the rule
more clearly by specifying what the party attacking the mortgage would need to prove
to void it. In this case the terms of the mortgage authorized the mortgagor to sell
the mortgaged goods in the course of trade. The mortgage contained no agreement
that the proceeds be applied to the debt. The plaintiff contended that the mortgage was
void in the absence of an affirmative showing that mortgagor was required to account.
The court pointed out that this did not necessarily follow. "The question of fraudulent
intent is a question of fact, and not of law. Therefore, until the contrary appears, it
will be presumed that a mortgagor who is permitted to retain possession of and sell
mortgaged chattels does so under an agreement to account as the agent of the
mortgagee. . . . This is the limit to which presumptions in favor of good faith will be
carried under § 4924, REv. ST. 1881. If, however, it affirmatively appears that there
was no agreement to account, and the mortgagor is permitted, either by an express or
implied agreement with the mortgagee, to continue in possession, with the right to sell
the property and appropriate the proceeds to his own use, the transaction will be regarded
as a fraud upon creditors, and void. . . . Such an understanding may appear by proof
of an oral agreement, or it may be inferred from the fact that the mortgagor made sales
of the property and used the proceeds, with the knowledge of the mortgagee, without
being asked or required to account." New v. Sailors, supra at 412-413, 16 N.E. at 611.
Accord, Vermillion v. First National Bank of Greencastle, 59 Ind. App. 35, 105 N.E.
530 (1914) ; Hamrick v. Hoover, 41 Ind. App. 411, 84 N.E. 28 (1907) ; Stout v. Price,
24 Ind. App. 360, 56 N.E. 857 (1899); Fletcher v. Martin, 126 Ind. 55, 25 N.E. 886
(1890) ; Mayer v. Feig, 114 Ind. 577, 17 N.E. 159 (1887). In the case of General High-
ways System v. Thompson, 88 Ind. App. 179, 155 N.E. 262 (1928), the court apparently
took a slightly different view on the rule. There the mortgage on its face required the
borrower to account for one-half of the proceeds of sale and was silent as to the other
one-half. The court, after reviewing the Indiana cases, held the mortgage void as to
general creditors for permitting the mortgagor to retain and sell the merchandise and
to withdraw one-half of the proceeds for operating the business. This case would appear
to hold that the mortgage agreement must require the mortgagor to apply proceeds
to the debt, or at least that the mortgage will be void if the mortgagor uses proceeds
for other purposes. Whether it accurately states the Indiana law is questionable, as no
other Indiana Case raised the point prior to the passage of the 1935 Chattel Mortgage
Act which substantially codified the General Highways rule. lit re. Jettner, 24 F. 2d 734
(D. Ind. 1928) held a mortgage on goods void, but there it was proved as a fact that
the mortgagor, with the consent of the mortgagee, did not apply proceeds to the debt.
At least, it appears safe to say that if it can be proved that the borrower has not applied
proceeds to the debt, with the express or implied permission of the lender, the mortgage
will be void as to creditors.
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tion to the validity of a mortgage which permits sale of mortgaged prop-
erty, that the proceeds of the sale be applied to the reduction of the mort-
gage debt. 5 Unfortunately the borrower may not be in a financial posi-
tion to apply all the proceeds from sales to reduce the debt. Payrolls
and operating expenses must be met, and his flow of incoming inventory
must be maintained. As a consequence, if all the proceeds are turned
over to the lender, new loans may be required to allow the borrower to
remain in business. The requirement of application of all proceeds to
the debt may force the borrower to pay the loan faster than is economic-
ally feasible and may necessitate a series of new loans. Thus, the Indi-
ana Chattel Mortgage Act offers no satisfactory solution to the fraudu-
lent conveyance threat.
The fraudulent conveyance situation under the Trust Receipts Act
is ambiguous. The act applies the Benedict rule to proceeds, and the
lender must demand an accounting every ten days to insure that his lien
on such proceeds remains valid. 6 However, the act is silent as to the
effect of the Benedict rule on retained inventory. The question arises
whether the lender loses not only his lien on proceeds, but also on in-
ventory remaining in the hands of the borrower, if he allows the bor-
rower free use of the proceeds of sale. Since the act discloses no in-
tention to change the Benedict rule, the usual rules of law apply" and the
lien on retained inventory is probably lost. 8 However, the only reported
case dealing with the matter, while not holding squarely on the point,
indicates that the lender's failure to police will not destroy the lien on
retained merchandise." At best the point is uncertain, and in the ab-
75. IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-506 (Burns 1951); Ed Hughes Furniture Company v.
Caughran, 218 F. 2d 906 (7th Cir. 1955); Goldberg v. Britton, 119 Ind. App. 90, 84
N.E. 2d 201 (1949).
76. IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-610 (Burns 1951).
77. The act specifically states that, in cases not provided for, the rules of law and
equity continue to apply. Id. § 51-617.
78. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70:58 n. 6 (14th ed. 1941) ; 2 GLENN, FRAUDU-
LENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERFNCES § 558 (1940).
79. Universal Credit Company v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E. 2d 28
(1945). Here the borrower had sold seven cars held under a trust receipt arrangement
with the lender, and had taken conditional sales contracts as proceeds. The borrower had
then assigned the contracts to defendant bank. The lender sued the bank to recover
the contracts. The complaint showed on its face that the lender had failed to demand
the proceeds from the sales of six of the cars until more than ten days after the dates
of sale, but had made such a demand within ten days from the sale of the seventh car.
The trial court sustained the bank's demurrer to the complaint. On appeal the Supreme
Court affirmed as to the paragraphs of complaint concerning the first six cars, but
reversed as to the paragraphs concerning the seventh car, holding that the lender's demand
within ten days of sale perfected his lien on the proceeds from that sale even as against
a third party. While the point was not specificially discussed, one could argue from this
holding that the lender's failure to police adequately, although destroying his lien
on the proceeds of goods sold more than ten days before demand for accounting, did not
operate to destroy his lien on merchandise still in the hands of the borrower. The court
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sence of clear judicial construction it behooves the lender to periodically
police the activities of the borrower.
The Indiana Accounts Receivable Statute makes no attempt to
avoid the Benedict rule. The statute allows the borrower to collect the
accounts,8" but is silent as to what disposition he must make of collec-
tions. It is therefore presumed that if the lender allows the borrower to
have "unfettered control" of these proceeds the Benedict rule will apply
to void the lender's lien as against third parties. Also the rule voiding
the lender's lien if the borrower has control over merchandise returned
by account debtors is probably applicable.81 Therefore, the lender must
regularly police the transaction as to both proceeds collected and returned
goods."
Unfortunately the Factor's Lien Act does not expressly answer the
threat of Benedict v. Ratner. It may be argued that the Benedict doc-
trine does not apply to the factor's lien ;83 but, if applicable, it might be
used to destroy the lien not only on proceeds, but also on the remaining
recognized the validity of the lien on proceeds from such merchandise in the one instance
where the lender made the requisite demand. If the lender's failure to police adequately
had destroyed his lien on merchandise as yet undisposed of, then presumably the court
would not have recognized the validity of his lien on the proceeds of such merchandise.
A 1946 study made by the New York Law Revision Commission indicates that failure
to police will not destroy the lien on remaining goods held under trust receipt, but the
report warns that the opposite result could be reached. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
COisIssION 351, at 485 (1946).
80. IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-2103 (Burns 1950).
81. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
82. The requirement that the borrower pay over proceeds of collected accounts is
probably desirable under a statute like Indiana's which requires neither notification
of account debtors nor recording. The policing requirement is a judicially developed
rule for the protection of unsecured creditors who would otherwise be injured in the event
that upon borrower's insolvency the lender could satisfy the entire amount of his
original loan out of the borrower's accounts. The policing rule causes the amount out-
standing on the loan to be reduced as accounts are collected and also requires the lender
to keep a close watch on the borrower's activities. These two attributes of the policing
rule afford some measure of protection to unsecured creditors who may be unaware
of the lender's interest and may be unable to discover such interest in the absence of
any recording. In addition, the very mechanics inherent in policing may give some
notoriety to the existence of the assignment. However, when recording of the assignment
of accounts is required, the need to retain the policing rule diminishes. If the lender's
interest is recorded, prospective creditors can check the record to discover outstanding
interests and need not rely on appearances. Recording would, in effect, replace policing
as a means of protecting creditors.
83. Mr. Justice Brandeis in a footnote to his opinion in the Benedict case intimated
that the rule might not apply to the New York factor's lien act. "N.Y. Personal
Property Law, § 45 authorizes the creation of a general lien or floating charge upon
a stock of merchandise, including after-acquired chattels, and upon accounts receivable
resulting from the sale of such merchandise. It provides that this lien or charge
shall be valid against creditors provided certain formalities are observed and detailed
filing provisions are complied with. It is possible that, if its conditions are performed,
the section does away with the rule 'that retention of possession by the mortgagor with
power of sale for his own benefit is fraudulent as to creditors'." 268 U.S. 353, 361
n. 11 (1925). The force which can be given to this dictum is questionable.
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goods and accounts, were the borrower given free use of proceeds. How-
ever, Colbats v. Mechanicks National Bank,84 the only reported case which
has considered the application of the Benedict rule to a factor's lien when
the statute 5 was silent as to control of proceeds, held that the rule did
not apply to defeat the lien on merchandise still retained by the borrower,
even though the borrower had applied the proceeds freely to his own use.
Although the Benedict rule was the common law of New Hampshire,86
the court concluded that the factor's lien act abolished the rule since the
act contained no requirement for policing. Whether the Indiana courts
or a federal court in bankruptcy would adopt this same line of reasoning
in construing the Indiana act is at least questionable.
The applicability of the Benedict rule to accounts receivable held
under a factor's lien is likewise uncertain under the Indiana act. The
act does abolish the harsh rule that the lien is lost merely because the
borrower accepts returned merchandise and thereafter deals with it, or
because he grants credits or adjustments to account debtors.8 However,
as to the borrower's control over proceeds from accounts receivable, the
act is silent. In construing a section of the New Hampshire act8" which
was very similar to the Indiana act, the First Circuit held that dominion
by the borrower over the proceeds of accounts receivable "rendered the
assignment void as a fraud on creditors under the doctrine of Benedict v.
Ratner. . . . "" The Colbath case" was held applicable only to goods.
In response to this decision the New Hampshire Legislature abolished the
policing rule as to accounts receivable. 2 Whether or not the Indiana
84. 96 N.H. 110, 70 A. 2d 608 (1950).
85. N.H. LAWS 1943, c. 161.
86. In re Freaman, 84 F. Supp. 441 (D. N. H. 1949) ; Putnam v. Osgood, 52 N.H.
148 (1872). See cases cited annot., 73 A.L.R. 236, 241 (1931).
87. While the case might be criticized on its reasoning that legislative silence
overruled common law, policy-wise the decision seems correct. As pointed out in note
82 supra, once the lender's interest is recorded, there is less reason to retain the policing
requirement to protect creditors. The New Hampshire Court by judicial construction
seems to have carried out legislative intent which was not clearly expressed in the
statute.
88. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1205 (Burns Supp. 1955).
89. N.H. LAWS 1943, c. 161, § 5.
90. Manchester Nat. Bank v. Roche, 186 F. 2d 827, 833 (1st Cir. 1951). "The
legislature of New Hampshire seems to have chosen . . . not to abrogate entirely the
rule of Benedict v. Ratner but rather to qualify it, so as to render it inapplicable to
certain extreme situations . . ." i.e., returned goods and adjustments with account
debtors. While the court was probably correct in its strict statutory interpretation, it
seems to have frustrated legislative intent. The case stands as a caveat to vague drafts-
manship. Unfortunately, the Indiana Act contains language very similar to the New
Hampshire Act.
91. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
92. After the Manchester case was handed down in February, 1951, the New
Hampshire Act was amended. See N.H. REv. LAws c. 446, § 446:7 (1955).
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Legislature intended to abolish the accounts receivable policing rule, in
light of the New Hampshire cases it would appear foolhardy for a factor
to proceed on the theory that the rule was abrogated.
It is unfortunate that the Legislature has failed to deal clearly with
these problems. In the absence of a clear rejection of the Benedict rule,
the factor, to safely retain his lien, must apparently require the borrower
to account for the proceeds of sales. Thus, the Factor's Lien Act is
subject to the same objection as the Chattel Mortgage Act. Neither pro-
vides a safe, simple means whereby the parties can create a floating lien
on the borrower's inventory or accounts.
The Uniform Commercial Code expressly repeals the rule of Bene-
dict v. Ratner." The secured party does not lose his interest in the origi-
nal collateral merely because he allows the borrower to exercise dominion
over proceeds. The original security agreements may embrace after-
acquired collateral, including future accounts, without further action by
the parties.94 Furthermore, Article 9 expressly validates the floating
lien.95 Thus, Article 9 does several important things which the Indiana
statutes fail to do. 1) It takes a definite stand on the rule of Benedict v.
Ratner. 2) By its position on after-acquired goods, future accounts, and
future advances it clearly validates the floating lien without necessitating
a mass of cumbersome and costly paper-work. 3) It equates accounts
receivable with inventory. 4) It defines the rights of the various classes
of parties to the various forms of proceeds arising from the disposition
of collateral.
Any change in existing law as revolutionary as Article 9 will
naturally elicit much comment. While the majority of the comments
93. Ui oRm CommERciAL CODE § 9-205.
94. Id. § 9-204.
95. See id. § 9-205, Comment 1. The Code defends its repeal of the Benedict rule
on policy grounds: "The principal effect of the Benedict rule has been, not to discourage
or eliminate security transactions in inventory and accounts receivable-on the contrary
such transactions have vastly increased in volume-but rather to force financing
arrangements in this field on to a self-liquidating basis. Furthermore several Circuit
Court cases drew implications from . . . Benedict . . . which have required
lenders . . . to observe a number of needless and costly formalities: for example it has
been thought necessary for the debtor to make daily remittances to the lender of all
collections received, even though the amount remitted is immediately returned to the
debtor in order to keep the loan at an agreed level. Nothing in section 9-205 prevents
such degree of 'policing' or dominion as the secured party and the debtor may agree
upon; business and not legal reasons will determine the extent to which strict accounta-
bility, segregation of collections, daily reports and the like will be employed." Ibid.
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have been favorable,"8 the Article has not been free from criticism." The
chief criticism has been directed at the possibility that one lender may be
able to monopolize all credit extension to a borrower by getting a security
interest in all of his present and future assets. While the possibility of
abuse exists, freedom of competition should safeguard against monopoly
in financing, and the remote possibility of abuse seems far outweighed
by the benefits which can accrue from a proper use of Article 9.
The existing confusion in almost all jurisdictions over the law of
security on shifting collateral is intensified in Indiana because of the
large degree of overlap between statutes. The new Factor's Lien Act,
while somewhat simplifying the creation of a security interest in shifting
merchandise, fails to settle serious problems existing before its adoption.
96. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security,
1952 Wis L. REv. 348; Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 183 (1951) ; Shattuck, Secured
Transactions-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial
Code, Article 9, 29 WASH. L. REv. 1, 195,263 at 288-91 (1954).
97. See, e.g., Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in
Codification, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1951) ; Kupfer, Accounts Receivable, Trust
Receipt, and Related Types of Financing Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 278 (1953). The pros and cons were presented to the New York
Law Revision Commission. See NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS No. 65 (H), (I),
(J) (1954). The comments vary from extremely favorable to extremely opposed. For
example, a letter from Mr. Joseph S. Techteler, chairman of the Commerce and In-
dustry Association of New York task force assigned to study Article 9, reports that the
task force highly recommends adoption of Article 9 even if the balance of the Code
fails of enactment. The task force particularly favored the repeal of Benedict v. Ratner
and the validation of the floating lien. Id. No. 65 (H) at 5. On the other hand the
report of the National Commercial Finance Conference, Inc. voiced strong opposition
to the floating lien on the grounds that one lender could monopolize the financing
activities of one borrower. Id. No. 65 (H) at 22-26. Other objections are that the easy
credit provisions will work hardships on unsecured creditors, that new terms used will
be confusing to businessmen and will result in a vast increase in litigation, that lenders
at their peril will have to determine the correct classification of the goods, that record-
ing of accounts receivable financing will hurt borrowers in the eyes of their customers,
and that the secured creditor's rights of redemption are too restrictive. But the answers
to many of these objections are apparent. The extent to which unsecured creditors
would be hurt is of course speculative, but a number of commentators do not think they
would be affected to any great extent. See e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 96, at 389-90;
Memo of Robert W. Weeks, Submitted on Behalf of the John Deere Plow Co., NEW
YORK LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT No. 65 (H) 61 at 69 (1954). Certainly if business men
can understand such complex statutes as the Trust Receitps and Factor's Lien Acts they
can master the Code. New terms and provisions were introduced in former security
acts and the litigation that arose was strikingly scarce; provisions remain which have yet
to be judicially construed. It would appear easier for lenders to correctly classify goods
as equipment or inventory than to correctly classify their transaction as a conditional
sale, or trust receipt, or chattel mortgage. That recording of a statement of accounts
receivable financing will hurt a borrower in the eyes of his customers or suppliers
is doubtful and seems to be a throwback to a stigma of days gone-by. Certainly the
secured creditor's rights on default are less restrictive than under the Conditional Sales
Act and no more restrictive than under the Trust Receipts Act. To the extent that
objections to the Code are valid they should be considered, but it appears that most of
the objections are simply not well founded.
NOTES
While attempting to resolve Indiana's security problems, the Legislature
has only compounded confusion by the enactment of the Factor's Lien
Act. The solution lies in legislation which deals squarely with the prob-
lem areas and which simplifies and consolidates the entire law of chattel
security. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does this by re-
pealing existing legislation and by taking a clear and comprehensive ap-
proach toward modern chattel security problems. Article 9, or legislation
approaching the problem in a similar manner, should be adopted, even if
the balance of the Uniform Commercial Code is ignored. Only through
such positive action can the problems inherent in chattel security be satis-
factorily resolved."8
THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
In general, the possessor of land is not liable for harm to trespassers
caused by his failure to put his property in a safe condition for their
reception.' An increasing regard for human safety has led to the de-
velopment of certain exceptions to this rule, among which is the so-called
attractive nuisance doctrine.2 This doctrine has been applied generally,
but not uniformly, by the American courts to allow, under proper cir-
cumstances, recovery for injuries suffered by infant trespassers. Some
jurisdictions have made more conservative applications of the doctrine
than others and a few have rejected it altogether, but the mass of prece-
98. The fate of the Uniform Commercial Code as a whole has been left in doubt
by the failure of the New York Law Revision Commission to recommend its enactment
in New York. NEw YORK LEGISLATIvE DOCUMENT No. 65 (A) (1956). The Com-
mission, after three years study, stated that codification of commercial law would be
of value to both the legal profession and the public, but concluded that the Uniform
Commercial Code was not satisfactory in its present form. Id. at 105-6. However, the
Commission's report as to Article 9 of the Code is favorable. "Article 9 would ac-
complish a significant reform of the law of personal property security. The Commission
believes that the approach taken by Article 9 as a whole is sound in theory and satis-
factorily developed in most of its elements." Id. at 90. The Commission specifically
approved the Code's approach in validating the floating lien, id. at 82-3, in abrogating
of the rule of Benedict Iv. Rather, id. at 81, and in adjusting priorities of claims to the
proceeds of the original collateral, id. at 84. Thus, while codification of the entire com-
mercial law does not appear likely in the immediate future, enactment of a comprehensive
chattel security statute patterned after Article 9 would be a significant present imporve-
ment in the Indiana law.
1. PROSSER, TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 333 (1934).
2. "Nuisance" because it is an unreasonable use by a person of his land, working
an injury to another; "attractive" because in the early cases it was thought that an
attraction to trespass was essential to the action. Though today a great majority of the
states do not require an initial attraction, the original nomenclature has been retained.
